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Investment rates in China have often been highest under leftist
(hardline) political regimes, not rightist (softline) political re-
gimens.
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Socialist economic growth in China and Eastem  *  Why investment hunger is an inevitable
Europe has long been characterized by invest-  consequence of social planners' rational chioices.
ment hunger, drives toward expansion, and
cyclical fluctuation of investment rates.  *  When a drive toward expansion can cause a
permanent shortage of consumption goods.
For decades, relatively high groA  rates -
often accompanied by a shortage of consumption  Through numerical examples and empirical
goods - have typically been achieved at the  tests, Zou provides a framework w:thin which to
consumers'  expense.  analyze political investment cycles in a socialist
economy.  In China, Zou linds that high invest-
Treating social planners as self-interested  ment rates have often been linked to leftist (or
bureaucrats, Zou ofi'rs  a positive model to help  hardline) political regimes and low or moderate
understand the norms of socialist economic  investment rates with "rightist" (or so[tline)
growth. This model demonstrates:  political regimes.
H  flow rapid capital accumulation tends to
serve the social planners' own interests.
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I. introduction
In  tradltlonal  optimal  growth  models  for  a centrally  planned  economy,  e. g.
Cass (1965)  and  Koopmans  (1965),  social  planners  maximize  an lntertemporal
soclal  welfare  function  defined  on per  capita  consumption,  subject  to the
dynamic  constraint  of capital  accumulation.  The  results  from  these  models  have
become  the  folklore  of modern  economics:  there  exists  a unique  optimum  path
converging  asymptotically  to the  unique  equilibrium;  the  optimum  capital  stock
in  long-run  Is  determined  by the  famous  modified  golden  rule,  I.e.,  marginal
productivity  of capital  is  equal  to the  natural  growth  rate  of population  plus
the  time  discount  rate  of social  planners.  In  these  models,  social  planners
all  act In the  Interest  of the  society.  They  do not  have  any  objective
function  other  than  the  welfare  of the  people,  and  their  personal  Images  are
only reflected  In the  time  discount  rate.  Cass (1965)  provides  a typical
picture  of the  central  planners:  "The  central  planning  authority's  concept  of
social  welfare  is  related  to the  ability  of the  economy  to  provide  consumption
goods  over time.  In  particular,  welfare  at any  point  of time  Is  measured  by  a
I  am grateful  to  Bela  Balassa,  Richard  Caves,  Janos  Kornai,  Andrew  Newman,
Dwight  Perkins,  Yingyi  Qlan,  Jeffrey  Sachs  and  Xinsheng  Zeng for  very  helpful
discussion  and  comments.  The  first  version  of this  paper  was  presented  In
Janos  Kornai's  workshop  at  Harvard,  I  thank  the  seminar  participants  for their
suggestions.
1utility  Index  of current consumption per capita ....  The central planning
authority  recognizes  that  consumption  tomorrow  is  not  the  same  thing  as
:onsumption  today.  For  thls  reason,  It takes  the  politically  pragmatic  view
that  its  planning  obligation  is  stronger  to  present  and  near  future
generations  than  to  far  removed  future  generations.  This  view is implemented
.n  practice  by discounting  future  welfare  at a  positive  rate".
This  approach  to  socialist  growth  suffers  .rom  serious  limitations  when
compared  to  socialist  reality.  First  of all,  traditional  optimal  growth  models
are  based  on an insufficient  understanding  or InH  ed,  a misunderstanding  of
the  nature  of the  social  planners.  This  point  has  been  emphasized  by Janos
Kornal  In  his  various  studles  (  Kornal,  1982,  1986,  1988).  With  both  political
power  and  economic  resources  in  their  control,  social  planners  are  not
constrained  or directed  to choose  the  optimum  feasible  growth  path  with
respect  to the  only  criterion,  which Is  to  maximize  social  welfare.  "Such  an
unworldly  bureaucracy  never  existed  in  the  past  and  will  never  exist  In  the
future.  Political  bureaucracies  have Inner  conflicts  reflecting  the  divisions
of  society  and the  diverse  pressures  of varlous  social  groups.  They  pursue
their  own Individual  and  group  Interests,  Including  the Interests  of the
particular  specialized  agency  to  which  they  belong.  Power  creates  an
irresistable  temptation  to  make  use  of it.  A bureaucrat  must  be
interventionist  because  that  Is  his  role  in the  society;  It Is  dictated  by his
situation"  (Kornai  1986,  pp. 1726-27).  In  practice,  social  planners  are  often
investment  growth  rate  maximizers  (Grosfeld,  1987),  and their  personal
interests  are  more  connected  to  the  persistent  expansion  of their
organizations  than  to the  Increase  In  people's  consumption.  In  their
investment trategies,  "the  highest  priority  is  placed  on Industry,  and  within
industry  on heavy  industry,  and  within  heavy  Industry  on the  part  related  to
2the  military.  ...  Anztong  the  neglected,  non-priority  sectors,  one typically
finds  agriculture,  and  even  more  so  all the  branches  of the  tertiary  or
service  sector,  such  as transport  and  telecommunication,  housing,  other
communal  services,  domestic  trade,  and  health.  This  diversion  of resources
from  consumption  to Investment  takes  place  not  provisionally  for two  or three
years,  but  for  decades,  for twenty,  thirty,  or forty  years".  (Kornal,  1988,
p.2 44).
In  this  paper,  we intend  to  offer  a simple  alternative  model  to  capture
certain  essential  aspects  of  socialist  economic  growth.  The  most imnortant
ieature  of the  model  Is In  defining  the  social  planners'  objective  function  in
both  per  capita  consumption  and  per  capita  capital  stock.  The  model  Is
Justified  and set  up ln  Section  II.  In  Its  abstract  form,  thls  modelling  was
presented  by Mordecal  Kurz In 1968.  That  paper  has long  been  neglected  in the
economics  profession  partly  because,  we guess,  Kurz  has  not  offered  any
Justification  for  the  so-called  wealth  effects  model.  In this  paper,  we are
able to  find  a realistic  setting  for  the  Kurz  model  In socialist  economic
growth.
In  Section  III,  we  demonstrate  that  this  simple  model  provides  good  framework
for  the  understanding  of "Investment  hunger"  and  "expansion-drive"  studied  by
Kornal  (1980).  Section  IV  derives  a theory  of polltical  Investment  cycle  frcm
our  basic  model.  It Is  shown  that  the  investment  rates  (or  accumulation  rates
In  the  terminology  of socialist  economics)  are  related  to different  political
regimes  In  socialist  countries.  In  Section  V,  we will look  at the  empirical
data  on lnvestment  rates  from 1952  to 1985  In  China.  The  variations  on
Investment  rates  throughout  those  years  can  be substantially  explained  by the
change  of political  power  at the  top  level  of government,  evidence  supporting
3the  theory  of the  political  investment  cyc:'e.
II.  The  Model  and Its  Justification
We define  the  Instantaneous  utility  function  of social  planners  at a  given
time  t  as the  summation  of two  parts:  u(c  t) +  iv(k  t). ct Is  consumption  per
capita  and  kt Is  capital  stock  per  capita  at time  t.  Social  planners  derive
positive  utility  from  both  consumption  enjoyed  by che  people  and  capital  stock
owned  by the  state,  so the  first  order  derivatives  of functions  u(.)  and  v(.)
are  positive.  The  Greek  letter  x  Is  a  positive  constant  that  measures  the
importance  of capital  accumulation  from  the  point  of  view  of the  social
planners.  In  later  sections,  we  will allow  x  to  take  different  values,  and its
effects  on capital  accumulation,  the  Investment  rate  and const..Iption  will  be
studied.  Furthermore,  for technical  reason,  we assume  that  the  second  order
derivatives  of u(.)  and  v(.)  are  negative,  and  that:
lim  u'Cc  ) =X
ct  -->0
which guarantee the  sufficiency  of  the  first  order  condltions  for
optimization,  and  exclude  the  corner  solution  of zero  consumption.
In  modelling  the  social  planners'  preference,  we maintain  that  social  planners
do care  about  people's  consumption,  and the  improvement  in  the  living  standard
of the  people  seems  to  Justify  their  manipulation  of  political  power  and
economic  resources  In  a sociallst  economy.  But it Is  more important  to  note
that  social  planners'  own Interest  lies  more  directly  In  the  expansion  of the
firm  and  public  organization  of which  they  are In  charge.  Social  planners  are
not Just  a group  of persons  In  the  central  planning  bureaU,  they  consist  of
all  persons  involved  in  formulating  the  plan,  from  the  managers  at the  bottom
4to the  minlsters  at the top.  According  to  Janos  Kornal  (1981,  1386,  1988).  the
first  and  the  most important otivation  for  accelerated  capital  accumulation
Is  the  Identification  of social  planners  with their  own  Jobs.  An expansion  of
the  firm  or organization  under  tl'Ir  direct  control  is  always  a source  of
satisfaction.  The  second  motivation  is  prestige.  "A la -er  organization  brings
more  prestige,  and  also  more  power"  (Kornal,  1981).  "Tha  simple  urge to  exert
power  over  people,  and  to  exercise  some  discretion  over  the  allocatlon  of
physical  resources  can  also  make  managers  strive  for  higher  Investment  levels
for their  firm"  (Kornal,  1988,  p.264).  So "it  Is lmportant  to  note that
Investment  hunger  and  expansion  drive  characterize  not  only the  behavior  of
the  top  manager  and  his subordlnates  In  a particular  firm,  but  also the
attitude  of economic  agents  at all levels  of the  bureaucratic  hlRrarchy  in  a
socialist  system....  the  general  ideology  of the  system  favors  expansion,  and
no claimant's  application  for  funds  is  ever  regarded  as  unreasonable  or
unethical  by anyone  in the  hierarchy.  On the  contrary,  everyone  considers  such
a request  as the  natural  and  normal  behavior  within  the  system."  (Kornal,
1988,  pp.264-265,  Italic  added.)
This  assessment  of socialist  planners  Is  essentially  th.  ;-ne  as the  one  used
In the  analysis  of  bureaucrats  in  western  democracies.  For  example,
Orzechowski  (1977)  defines  the  bureaucrat's  utility  function  directly  on the
output  produced  by his  bureau  and  the  capltal  stock  or labor  In  his  control.
And  the  striving  for  more  budget  revenue  In  western  public  sectors  resembles
the  Investment  hunger  and  expansion  drive  In  rocialist  economies.
With these  discussions,  we might  call  w  which  appeared  in the  social  planners'
utility  function  as the  measure  of the  degree  of expansion  drive.  A  large
value  of x  means  that  the  social  planners  are  highly  expansion  oriented;  and  a
Szero  value  of n brlngs  us back  to  Ramsay-Cass-Koopman's  mathematical  utopia  of
socialism.  (Phelps  (1961)  presents  the  golden  rule  of capital  accumulation  In
"a  fable  for  growthmen".  In  reality,  where  we can  f'nd  the  King  of the  Kingdom
f  Solovia?)
To  proceed  with  our  model,  we assume  that  the  social  planners  maximlze  the
following  lntertemporal  *tility  with  discounting  (for  notation  convenlence,  we
omit  the  time  subscript  t  of all  variables  from  not  on):
X[u(c) +  nv(k)le  dt  p >  . (1)
0
where  p Is  the  social  planners'  subjective  rate  of discount.
There  Is  a standard  neoclassical  production  function  f(k) In the  economy  with
f'(k)  >  0, and  f"(k)  < 0. Capital  Is  subject  to a  depreciation  rate  6. The
population  growth  rate  Is  exogenously  given  as  n. So capital  accumulation  in
per  capita  term  follows  the  dynamic  equation:
k =  f(k) - c - (n + 8)k  (2)
Social  planners  maximize  (1)  subject to  the dynamic constraint (2). The
current  value  Hamiltonian  H is  defined  by:
H =  u(c) +  iv(k)  +  AMf(k)  - c - (n  +  M)kI  (3)
The  optimal  paths  for  consumption  and investment  are:
1
c =  --  rv'(k)  +  u'(c)(f'(k) - n - 6 - p)]  (4)
- u'(c)
k - f(k) - c - (n + 5)k  (5)
6lim  eptAk  -O  (6)
t-->m
We are  going  to  make  a detailed  analysis  of above  dynamics  In  the  next
sf:ct  Ion.
III.  The  Dynamics  of the  Model  and  the  Properties  u  the  Equilibrium
As noted  by  Kurz (1968),  the  dynamic  systems  (4)  and (5)  may  easily  result  In
multiple  equilibria,  and  some  equilibrium  points  are  saddle  point  stable,
while  some  are totally  unstable.  To see  this,  denote  the  equilibrium  values  of
consumption  and  capital  as c  and  k ,  and linearize  the  systems  around  these
values:
.. v"(k )  +  u'(c )f"(k  )
c  (n+8+p)  - f'(k)  c - c
(7)
k  -1  f'(k)  - n - a  k - k
Denote  the  2x2  matrix  as  M.  The  trace  of  the  matrix:
Trace  of  M =  p >  0 . (8)
As  the  t-ace  Is  the  sum  of  the  two  char-cteristic  roots  of the  systems,  at
least  one  of the  roots  is  positive.  Therefore we cannot  have  a stable
equilibrium  point.
Next the  determinant  of the  matrix  Is:
irv"(k  )+u'(c  )f"(k  )
A - (rA+8+p-f'(k  )l[f'(k  )-n-1]  - (9)
u"(c
7The  seoond  term  on the  right  hand  side  of (9)  Is  negative;  the  first  term  in
positive  or negative  depending  on  wihether  the  capital  stock  is  smaller  or
larger  than  the  golden  rule  capital  as  pointed  out  by Kurz (1968).  If the
steady  state  cap!tal  stock  is  equal  to  or larger  than  the  golden  rule  capital,
f'(k)  is  equal  to  or less  than  n +  6;  the  flrst  term  on the  right  hand  side  cf
(9)  is  also  negative  because  [n+6+p-4"(k I  is  positive  as shown  below  in
proposition  one. In  this  case,  A Is  negative.  For  A is the  product  of two
characteristic  roots,  negative  A Implies  that  one  root  Is  pos'tive  and  one
negative.  If  A  Is  positive,  then  both  roots  will  bw positive  as the  existence
of two  negative  roots  contradicts  (8).  For this  section,  we  will focus  .. n the
case  that  A is  negative,  that  is  to say,  there  exists  a unique  optimal  path in
the  neighborhood  of the  equilibrium.  Furthermure,  we assume  that  there  exists
only  one  equilibrium  for  the  systems.  A numerical  example  is  presented  in the
next  section  before  we go on to  discuss  the  political  Investment  cycle.  Of
course,  If  the  time  discount  rate  Is  very  small,  the  first  term  on  the
right  hand  side  of (9)  Is  negative;  so Is  A.
The  properties  of the  unique  saddle  point  equilibrium  follow  In  order:
Property  One:  The  equilibrium  capital stock  Is  larger than  the  modified
golden  rule  one.
To  show  this,  note that,  in  a steady  state,  we have:
*  {nv'(k  )  +  u'(c )[f'(k ) .,-8-p]D  =  0  (10)
-u'  (c
f(k )  - c  -(n +  8)k  =  0  (11)
8Earn (10):.
iTv'  (k )
f'(k  j  =  n +  + p - . <  n +  6  + p x  f(kmg)  (12)
u'  (c  )
where  k  m  denotes  the  modified  golden  rule  amount  of capital.  From (12),  it  Is
clear  that  k  > kmg as f"(.)  Is  negative.  The  explanation  Is  simple.  Since
:ocial  planners  benefit  dlrtctly  from  the  expansion  of the  eco Jmic
organizations  and since  the  welfare  of consumers  over the  lnfinlte  horizon  is
not the  only  criterion  for  planning,  the  short-riin  consumption  will  be partly
sacrified  for  the  expanslon  drive.  It  is  quite  possible  that,  as shown  In  next
numerical  example,  consumotion  Is  permanently  sacrificed  In  this  kind  of
models:  equilibrium  consumption  Is  lower  than  the  golden  rule  one  and  capital
is  over-accumulated.
Property  Two:  The  higher  the  value  of  n, the  higher  the  steady  state  capital.
Totally  differentiating  equations  (10)  and (l1J,  we have:
s  v'(k)  (13)
It is  simple  to  show that:
dk  1  v'(k)
=  _  . (14)
dir  a  U (c
which  Is  positive  as the  economy  is  on the  unique  optimal  convergent  path.  As
for  the  steady  state  consumption,  the  sign Is  ambiguous  depending  on whether
the  equilibrium  capital  Is  higher  or lower  than  the  golden  rule  capital.
The  effects  of n on Investment  and  consumption  on the  unique  optimal  path  can
9~lsu  be analyzed.  From (7),  the  solutions  of the  linearized  systems for  the
:.et;ivlor  of the  capital  stock  and  consumption  are:
kt =  k  (k  k )eet  (15)
0
kt  =  -O(k  - kt )  (16)
*  *0
Ct =  c  +  (f(k  )  - n  - - EON)(kt  - k  (17)
where  9 Is  the  negative  root  of the  dynamic  system:
1  2
0 =  - p  - VI  p  _4A  (18)
2
From (16)  and (17),  It is  clear  that,  through  Its  positive  effect  on steady
state  capital,  k ,  the  high  value  of n  leads  to  high investment  and low
consumption  on the  optimal  path  for  all  kt less  than  k . But  we should  note
that t  may  also  affect  e and  c . If  the  increase  In  i  tends  to lower  e,  lr.
other  words,  e becomes  more  negative,  then  the Investment  will be
unambiguously  high  as a :esult  of t  being  high.
Property  Three: The  higher  the value  of  n,  the  higher  the  steady
state  investment  rate (cs-  saving  rate).
In  the  steady  state,  Investment  Is  Just (n  + 8)k . Let the  investment  rate (or
saving  rate)  be s, then:
(n+8)k
s  =  . (19)
f(k )
ds  (n+6)  *  *  dk
--  [  tf(k  )-f'(k  )k-  (20)
dx  (f(k)2 dx
10h  is  positive since  dkk/dn is  positive  and  If(k )-f'(k )k I
ive  f-or  any  concave  funct  ion.
'  of  pr(>tert  es  *,t.i  Above  reve:al  how  social  planners'  pref  t.  i
t  e growth pattern lin  sE30lallst  economles. In the Cass  model,  ", .. w
..  the form  of social  welfare  functions  does not enter  Into  the
!etermination  of equilibrium capital stock. Even if  we  interpret the social
welfare function as the social planners' own preference, the equilib[  lum
capital and consumption are still Independent  of the social planners'
preference as long  as their preference is defined only on consumption. Recali
from Cass (1965), that In equilibrium:
f'(k g) =  n +  a +  p  (21)
f(k  g)  - c - (n +  S)kmg  =  O  (22)
so  the social welfare function itself plays no role In the  determination of
k  mg in  Cass model. (Please compare (21)  and (22)  with equilibrium conditions
(10)  and (11).)  The invention  by Kurz (1968)  provides us a rich picture for
she link  between preference and economic growth. Of course, as a positive
ipproach,  the Kurz model with proper Justification is much more realistic thuin
.he  Cass model when applied to a socialist economy.
IV.  A Numerical Example and an Illustration  of Political Investment  Cycle
.'ven  though the modified Kurz model gives us Interesting  results, the
e>istence of multiple equilibria brings about complicated dynamics even with
simple preferences and technology. Here we  show that, If  preference is the
.- c,ular lcgarithm  functions cf consumption and capital and if  technology is
11standard Cobb-Douglas, there  r  its  a unique equilibrium and a unique optimal
path.
Now the social planners maximize:
-Pt
I  [logc  + nlogk]e  dt  (23)
0
s.t.
k  k  - c  - nk  (24)
where 0 < a <  1, and we  have  set  8  equal  to  zero  for  simplicity.  The
corresponding optimal conditions are:
c
c  u-  rc  - ak  - (n+p)k]  (25)
Ic
k =  k  nk -c  (26)
Set the time derivatives of c and k equal to  zero  in  (25)  and  (26),  the
unique optimal equilibrium point Is:
1
kc =  n  +  a  - (27)
nn+n+p
* 
c =k  -nk  (28)
The determinant of the corresponding matrix M Is:
C  *O-1  2 Oa-1




S .- 2  <  0  (30)
1215  [:  <  a  <  I. So  there is one negative characteristic root and  one  positive
)t  the  equilibrium is saddle point stable.
It is  straightforward to check that
dk  . p+(l-an
=  kil-)k  2  >  0  (31)
du  (nn+nnp)
ds  (c)dk
- = n(l-a)k  (  >  0  (32)
di  dx
Next  we are  going  to see  under  which  circumstances  a  high  degree  of expanslon
drive  leads  to  dynamic  inefficiency.  In  Phelps  (1961),  the  golden  rule  capital
stock  at  which  consumption  is  maximized  is  given  as (for  Cobb-Douglass
technology):
kg  =  - -a  (33)
n
For  k  Is  larger  than  kg, it is  required  that:
it  + aX  a
(34)
nn + n +p  n




For  a = 0.25,  p =  0.05,  and  n =  0.01,  i  should  be larger  than  0.0125.  which  is
not  a strict  requirement.  So, In  this  case,  the  people's  consumption  is  not
only  sacrificed  on the  dynamic  path  converging  to the  steady  state,  but Is
also  sacrlficed  in  the  steady  state.
13:'  .use  ther-e  are two groups of social planners in the economy. Fvlh.,wg  n,
.nt  ion, we may  .. :aII  cne group  "softliners" or the "right", and Aho 
'  :  ir',ers'  or the ''left" Threy  ilternat  ively  control the pr esn,  . .
,an  I Ils  kriown  thtalt  in  siocIalIst  countries  sUCIh as  H'ng.iry,
*  ?  ts wa,r,d;s  (rc<.;umpt  Ion  rather  than  investmenrt  alw:.ys  come  ar  ,
*  .'t  ,f"  "softl.ine'  rule; the  "hardliners"  or  the  "left'  are  always
*'xpcinsion  oriented. (see  Kornal, 1988,  pp. 283-284). In  our model, if  we
J  r,.t e  IT  as the expanrsio  n desIre of the "left" and n  as the expains;:A-.:;
I  r
^f  the "right"  and  let  I 1 >  ir  >  ap/(1-an),  then  tnie  "left"  maximizes:
f[logc + nl 1logkI]eP  dt  (36)
0
s.t.
k=  k-  c  -nk  (24)
the "right" maxlmizes:
Jr[logc  r+ Tr  rlogk  rle  Pdt  (37)
0
s.t.
k =  ka  - c - nk  (24) r  r  r  r
:'he  initial  capital  stock  is the  same  for  both  g.oups:  ko =  k. To  avoid  t'.e
problem  of time  Inconsistency,  we assume  that  the  "left"  and  the  "right"  both
-cmmit  to the  optimal  programs  they  calculate at  time zero,  and  make  no
-hanges  later  on.
From  the  calculations  above,  It Is  easy  to obtain  that  In  steady  state
k1 >  kr  c  <  c  (38)
From (32),  the  steady  state  investment  rate  for  the  "left'  is  always  larger
than  the  one  for the  "right".  If  the  "left"  Is  In  power,  the  economy
14experiences  higher  investment  and lower  consumption;  If the  "right"  Is in
:&"er,  consumption  is  relatively high and Investment relatively lower.  The





where  E1 and  Er are  equilibrium  points  for the  "left"  and the  "right"
respectively.  If  the  economy  is  currently  In  El,  the  power  shift  from  the
"left"  to the  "right"  results  In  an immmediate  upward  Jump  In  consumption  and
in  a reduction  of investment;  the  new long-run  equilibrium  Is  Er where  capital
stock  Is lower  than,  but  consumption  Is  higher  than,  the  equilibrium  levels  at
E  l  The Investment  rates  fluctuate  following  the  political  power  shifts.  This
is  a demonstration  of political  Investment  cycles  at steady  states.
Investment  cycles  can  also  happen  on the  paths  converging  to the  steady
states.  In  Figure  II,  Pr and  P  are  the  optimal  convergent  pathes  for  the
'right"  and the  "left"  respectively.
c
Figure  II
15.f the economy is Initially on the path for the "right" P ,  a change in
Dlitical regime from the "right' to the "left" leads to an immediate Jowrnward
'Jmp  from  the path P  to the path P  Throughout time, the economy follows a
,-mpr  I
. i  ,zag  path, and Investment rates fluctuate accordingly on the path.
V. Historical  Evidence
In  this  3ection,  we present  a preliminary  empirical  study  of the  effects  of
political  change  on the  Investment  rate  In  China.  The labels  for  different
wings  of the  communist  party,  the  "right"  and  the  "left",  are  well  known  in
China.  The "left"  consists  of strong,  dogmatic  adherents  of socialism;  they
advocate  the  centralization  of economic  activities,  the  rapid  abolishment  of
private  ownership  In the  industrial  sector,  and the  rapid  transition  of the
agricultural  sector  from  prlvate  ownership  to  collective  ownershlp  and then  to
state  ownership.  Chairman  Mao Is the  symbol  of the  "left".  Those  on the"right"
are  more  often  associated  with  economic  policies  with  a capitalist  flavor,
such  as relying  on market  mechanisms  and  material  Incentives  In  the  planned
sectors  and  allowing  private  plots  and  contract  systems  In  agricutural
production. The prominent members of this group are Liu Shaoqi and Deng
Xiaoping.  They  were  known  as the  capitalist  representatives  In  the  communist
party  during  the  Cultural  Revolution.  The  power  struggles  between  the  "left"
and  the  "right"  have  shaped  the  hlstory  of China  In  the  past  four  decades,  and
their  effects  can  be seen in  every  aspect  of Chinese  society.  Our  present
focus  Is  on the  effects  of these  struggles  on the  Investment  rates.
The  following  table  contains  relevent  data  for  our  analysis.
16investment  consumption  productive  power regimes
year  rate as %  rate as %  Investment  as % of  as a dummy
of GNP  of GNP  total investment  variable
1952  21.4  78.6  50.8  0
195J  23.1  76.9  49.4  0
1954  25.5  74.5  50.3  0
1955  22.9  77.1  51.4  0
1956  24.4  75.6  71.0  0
1957  24.9  75.1  58.8  0
1958  33.9  66.1.  82.3  1
1959  43.8  56.2  86.9  1
1960  39.6  60.4  97.4  1
1961  19.2  80.8  78.5  0
1962  10.4  89.6  63.6  0
1963  17.5  82.5  63.9  0
1964  22.2  77.8  60.8  0
1965  27.1  72.9  70.7  0
1966  30.6  69.4  68.9  1
1967  21.3  78.7  82.2  1
1968  21.1  78.9  78.5  1
1969  23.2  76.8  76.2  1
1970  32.9  67.1  71.8  1
1971  34.1  65.9  76.2  1
1972  31.6  68.4  78.7  1
1973  32,9  67.1  73.7  1
1974  32.3  67.7  75.4  1
1975  33.9  66.1  73.4  1
1976  30.9  69.1  79.3  1
1977  32.3  67.7  70.9  1
1978  36.5  63.5  71.8  1
1979  34.6  65.4  64.1  0
1980  31.5  68.5  54.5  0
1981  28.3  71.7  46.8  0
1982  28.8  71.2  46.4  0
1983  29.7  70.3  52.5  0
1984  31.2  68.8  58.6  0
1985  33.7  66.3  57.7  0
Source.---Statistical Year Book of China, 1986
In the table, the power over economic planning Is represented by a dummy
variable; a value of zero means that the "right" controls the planning board,
while a value of one means that the "left" controls the planning. The term
"productive Investment" is special to Marxist and socialist economics, and
needs some explanation. It refers to Investment  that directly serves material
production or meets the needs of materlal production. Its counterpart Is
17non-productive  Investment,  which  includes  Investment  on  public  utilities,
nousing,  pub'ic  health,  social  welfare  and  education.  Since  non-productive
investment  Is  more  or less  related  to  people's  consumption,  especially  durable
and  public  consumption,  the  percentage  of  productive  investm-  t in  total
Investment  outlay  is  a more  accurate  measure  of accumulation.  The  fluctuations
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Figure III
During  the  period  1952-57,  economic  decision-makings  was  more  under  the
control  of the  "right"  as Mao  did  not totally  dominate  the  planning  processes
and  political  life  was  more  democratic  In  the  communist  party  than  lt
subsequently  became.  The Investment  rates  were in the  range  of 21.4  percent
and  25.5  percent.  The  average  share  of productive  investment  In  total
Investment  was  55.3%.  Both  production  and  consumption  went  up rapidly  in  those
six  years,  and those  Investment  rates  were later  regarded  as the  optimal  or
18normal  ones.
The  year 1957 was a turning point in  the political ^llmate of China. The
anti-`rightist"  movement  launched  by Mao  had  a fundamental  effect  on the
political  and  economic  life  of China.  With the  beginning  of the  "Great  Leap
Forward"  In 1958  and  of the  movement  of people's  communes  some  time  later,
economic  planning  was  dominated  by the  ideology  of the  "left".  The Investment
rate  jumped  up to  33.9  peicent,  43.8  percent  and  39.6  percent  In 1958,  1C59
and 1960  respectively.  The  average  share  of the  productive  Investment  for
those  three  years  was  up to  88.3  percent.  High Investment  rates  and  natural
calamities  during  this  period  caused  poverty,  hunger  and  death  all  over  China.
Facing  economic  disaster,  Mao  retreated  from  economic  planring  and  even
admitted  to  having  made  a mistake  in  1962.  The  power  over  planning  shifted
back Into  the  hands  of the  "right",  and  the  Chinese  economy  entered  a period
of adjustments.
From 1963  to 1965,  the  average  investment  rate  was  set  at  22.7  percent  and
productive  investme  S  only  accounted  for  64 percent  of total  Investment.
President  Liu  Shaoqi  even introduced  many  programs  In  agricultural  production
wl'ich  later  under  Deng  Xiaoping  became  important  Ingredients  of economic
reforms.
The  reign  of the  "right"  was  short-lived.  The  next ten  years,  1966-76,  were
those  of the  "Great  Cultural  Revolution",  and  Mao  and the  "left"  were In
absolute  control  of economic  planning.  Except  for  the  years  1967-69  when  the
economy  was almost  paralyzed  by  destructive  political  turmoil,  the Investment
rate  on the  average  was  above  31 percent,  and  75 percent  of  which  was  for
productlve  purposes.  After  Mao's  death,  his  chosen  successor.  Hua  Guofang,
19*  antinued  the  expansion  drive  of the  "left",  and  even  started  a "Foreign  Leap
-Krward"  from 1977  to 1979,  importing  large  amounts  of foreign  technology The
ivt!rage  investment  rate  was  above  34  percent.
r,,  1979,  politlcal  power  began  to shift  back to  the  "right",  and  Deng  Xiaoping
and the  "reformers"  came to the  forefront,  though  the  Ideology  of the  "left"
still  deeply  affected  planning  and  the  effects  of the  "Foreign  Leap  Forward"
stlll  kept  the Investment  rate  at a  high level  of 34.6  percent.  But in that
year,  the  proportion  of productive  investment  In  total  Investment  began  to
decrease.  From 1981  to 1985,  the  average  Investment  rate  went  down  to 30.8
percent,  and the  average  share  of productive  investment  was  at  a  historical
low  - 52.4  percent.  That is to  say,  a large  proportion  of Investment  was
diverted  to the Improvement  of residentlal  conditions,  service  sectors,  public
health  and  education.
So we can  see  that  the Investment  rates  and  political  changes  are  closely
related  In  China.  It Is  convenient  to test  how  much  fluctuations  In investment
rates  and  productive  Investment  rates  can  be explained  by the  political
changes  In  China's  socialist  history.  Here  we report  results  of a few
regression  equations:
It = 11.23  + 4.081)D + O.55ItI  (39)
(2.84)  (2.05)  (3.36)
2 R  =  0.50,  DW =  1.13
PIt =  31.25 + 12.36Dt +  0.45PI  (40)
(4.47)  (5.17)  (4.35i  (
R2 =  0.73,  DW =  1.93
where  It=  Investment  rate  at time  t,  Dt  =  dummy  variable  of political  change
(a  value  of one  refers  to the  "left"  regime  and  a value  of zero the  "right"
20regime),  and  PI.=  share  of productive  Investment  In  total  investment.
E:quations  (.9)  and (40)  both  show  that  political  changes  have  substantial
effects  on the  investment  rate  and the  productive  investment  rate.  1he
positive  coefficients  say  that  a "left"  regime  causes  high  rates,  and  a
'right"  regime  leads  to low  rates.  As Invest.ient  projects  ofteni  last  for  a few
years,  the  lagged  varlables  also  help to  explain  the  rates.
If  we exclude  the  politically  abnormal  years  1967-69,  then  political changes
alone  can  explain  about  half  of the  variations  In the  Investment  rates:
It  =  25.36  + 8.9Dt  (41)
(18.17) (5.19)
R  =  0.43,  DW - 0.74
PI  =  58.32 +  19.12D  (42)
(28.14) (6.51)t
R2 =  0.57  DW =  0.93
Two  points  should  be added  to  our  analysis  of  political  Investment  cycles  in
China.  First,  the  "right"  and  the  "left"  are  both  expansionists  by  definition
because  they  are  both  social  planners,  the  difference  being  only  a matter  of
degree.Throughout  time,  there  Is  a tendency  for  social  planners  to Increase
the  investment  rates;  this  can  be seen  from  regressing  the investment  rates
against  a time  variable:
It  =  5.07 +  4.22Dt +  0.48It 1 +  0.114TIME  (43)
(1.02)  (2.21)  (2.56)  (1.135)
2
R  =  0.52  DW -1.13
21Second,  political  factors  as an exogenous  variable  cannot  fully  exolain  all
fluctuations  in Investment  rates;  a theory  espoused  by T.  Bauer (1978)  and
Tanos  Kornal  (1980,  1988),  which  we may  call  as model  of  endogenous  investment
.,ycles,  has  developed  to  explain  investment  cycles  under  the  same  political
regime.  The  focus  of this  theory  Is to  relate  the  Investment  rate  to the
intensity  of shortage  In the  economy.  Social  planners  will  reduce  the
Investment  rate  when  shortage  intensity  Is  high,  and  raise  the Investment  rate
when shortage  intensity  Is low.  For  a model  developed  In  this line,  see  Zou
(1990).  These  two  theories  of investment  cycles  should  be taken  as
complementary,  and  "they  can  be  usefully  and  effectively  placed  side  by side
and,  taken  together,  they  do a good  Job  not  only  of explaining  the  regular
pattern  of the  cycle,  but  also  of explalning  Its  Irregularities"  (Kornai,
1988,  P.284).
VI.  SUMMARY
In  this  paper,  we have  offered  a positive  growth  model  that  sheds
considerable  light  on the  "norms"  of  socialist  growth,  such -s  investment
hunger,  expansion  drive,  chronic  shortage  and Investment  cycles.  This  model
also  provides  an analytical  framework  within  which  to study  the  relationship
between  Investment  fluctuations  and  political  changes  In  socialist  countries.
Preliminary  empirical  work  on China  has  provided  strong  support  for  this
approach.
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